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COMMENTS
DISCOVERING DISCRETION:
APPLYING INTEL TO § 1782 REQUESTS
FOR DISCOVERY IN ARBITRATION
Arbitration is an increasingly popular way for litigants to resolve
commercial disputes, both in the United States and abroad. With the
rise in the use of arbitration, issues related to international arbitration
are likely to appear in American courts with increasing frequency. It
is unclear whether American courts will assist in discovery
proceedings for foreign tribunals, as they often do for other
adjudicatory bodies, by compelling discovery from American entities
beyond the foreign body's jurisdiction. The primary statute dealing
with discovery for foreign courts is 28 U.S.C. § 1782. The Supreme
Court recently clarified the meaning of this statute in Intel Corp. v.
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.'1 However, courts deciding recent cases
have not consistently applied the Court's holdings to cases involving
arbitral panels.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, a federal court has authority to compel
discovery for many types of proceedings conducted outside the
United States:
The district court of the district in which a person resides or is
found may order him to give his testimony or statement or to
produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding in
a foreign or international tribunal, including criminal
investigations conducted before formal accusation.2
The statute does not define the term "foreign or international
tribunal," which Congress inserted in place of the phrase "any court
in a foreign country" when it revised the statute in 1 964 . Before the
1542 U.S. 241 (2004).
2 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
3See 28 U. S.C. § 1782 (195 8) (amended 1964); see also Nat'l Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns
535
536 ~CA SE WESTERN RESER VE LA W RE VIEW [o.5:
Court's 2004 decision in Intel, two circuit courts held that "foreign or
international tribunals" did not include private arbitral panels.4 Since
Intel, three courts have used § 1782 to compel discovery for use in
arbitral panels, although these courts did not follow uniform
reasoning.5 Furthermore, the extent to which these cases followed the
reasoning of Intel is not clear.
Intel gave the lower courts guidance for interpreting and applying
§ 1782, but did not explicitly define a "foreign or international
tribunal." The Court emphasized that courts should be restrained by
their own discretion rather than a narrow interpretation of the statute.
To make sure that discretion is applied in a way that furthers § 1782's
goal of international comity, the Intel Court provided factors to be
considered in the lower courts' exercise of discretion. However, when
a court considers a tribunal that is very different from the one at issue
in Intel, considerations beyond the explicitly named Intel factors may
be relevant. Consequently, a court considering a § 1782 request for an
arbitral panel should consider the policies underlying arbitration
generally in addition to the policies of the panel's jurisdiction.
Recent cases demonstrate that courts are uncertain about how to
apply the Intel holding to requests for discovery in foreign or
international arbitration. However, Intel does provide sufficient
guidance; by following its reasoning and holdings more precisely,
courts may arrive at well-reasoned and predictable outcomes. This
Comment analyzes the relevant cases to determine how courts can
best follow Intel in deciding § 1782 requests for private arbitral
panels.
1. DECISIONS PRECEDING INTEL: § 1782(A) DOES NOT APPLY TO
PRIVATE ARBITRAI. PANELS
The first case to address the application of § 1782 to discovery
requests for arbitral panels was National Broadcasting Co. v. Bear
Stearns & Co. ("NBC').6 The plaintiff, National Broadcasting
Company, requested discovery in anticipation of an arbitration
proceeding between private litigants before the International Chamber
& Co., 165 F.3d 184, 188-89 (2d Cir. 1999).
4 Nat'l Broad Co., 165 F.3d at 191; Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int'l, 168 F.3d 880, 883
(5th Cir. 1999).
5See In re Oxus Gold PLC (Oxus Gold II), No. 06-82-GEB, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
24061 (D.N.J. Apr. 2, 2007); In re ROZ Trading, Ltd., 469 F. Supp. 2d 1221 (N.D. Ga. 2006);
In re Hallmark Capital Corp., 534 F.Supp. 2d 951 (D. Minn. 2007).
6 165 F.3d 184.
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of Commerce, a private organization.7 The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that it could not grant the request because § 1782
did not apply to such private arbitral proceedings!
In coming to its conclusion, the NBC court first noted that
arbitration in the United States is governed primarily by the Federal
Arbitration Acte ("FAA"), which provides for more limited discovery
than § 1782.10 The court expressed concern that the discovery
procedure in the FAA might be exclusive, meaning that § 1782 would
conflict with the FAA to the extent that it broadened the discovery
available in arbitral proceedings beyond what the FAA would
otherwise permit.'1 While the court discussed this concern at length, it
ultimately based its holding on the text of § 1782. 12
The court considered the plain meaning of the term "foreign or
international tribunal" and found it to be ambiguous.'13 It then looked
to the legislative history of the current text of § 1782. Specifically, the
court referred to the report of the Commission on International Rules
of Judicial Procedure (the "Commission") that Congress had relied on
when it replaced the phrase "any court in a foreign country" with
"foreign or international tribunal."1  The report stated that the
Commission chose the word "tribunal . . . to make it clear that
assistance is not confined to proceedings before conventional
courts." 15 The report explicitly stated that the proposed changes to the
statute's language would include investigating magistrates in foreign
countries, but also stated more broadly:
In view of the constant growth of administrative and
quasi-judicial proceedings all over the world, the necessity
for obtaining evidence in the United States may be as
impelling in proceedings before a foreign administrative
7Id. at 186.
8 Id at 185.
99 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2006).
10 Nat'l Broad Co., 165 F.3d at 187-89. Specifically, the FAA does not (1) allow for
non-arbitrators to request discovery, (2) confer enforcement authority outside of the district
where the arbitrators are sitting, or (3) provide for pre-hearing depositions or document
discovery. Id.
IId. at 188 ("If the broader evidence-gathering mechanisms provided for in § 1782 were
applicable to proceedings before non-governmental tribunals such as private arbitral panels, we
would need to decide whether 9 U.S.C. § 7 is exclusive, in which case the two statutes would
conflict.").
12 Id at 187-88.
13 Id. at 188.
14 Id. at 189 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 88-1052, at 9 (1963); S. Rep. No. 88-1580 (1964),
reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782, 3788).
15 S. Rep. No. 88-1580, at 9 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782, 3788.
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tribunal or quasi-judicial agency as in proceedings before a
conventional foreign court.' 6
Based on the report, the NBC court determined that the Commission
had in mind only governmental entities. The court concluded that
Congress had not considered private dispute resolution to be within
the scope of § 1782 because there was no reference to such
proceedings in the report.'17
As a final point, the court noted that litigants often choose
arbitration because it typically involves limited discovery, making
arbitration more efficient and less costly than traditional litigation.'18
The discovery allowed under § 1782 is broader than that permitted by
the FAA as well as most foreign or international arbitration rules. The
NBC court reasoned that to allow broad discovery in these
proceedings would "create an entirely new category of disputes
concerning the . . . characterization of arbitral panels as domestic,
foreign, or international." 19 The court held that this distinction was
not grounded in policy and would not serve to advance the purpose of
§ 1782, which was passed as part of an effort to fuirther "practices of
judicial assistance and cooperation between the United States and
foreign countries with a view to achieving improvements."2
Shortly after the NBC case, the same question came before the
Fifth Circuit in Kazakhstan v. Biedermann International
("Biedernnann") .2 1 That court followed NBC, holding that § 1782 does
not include private international arbitration.2 The Biedermann court
determined that although § 1782 could be read to include arbitration,
''not every conceivable fact-finding or adjudicative body is covered,
even when the body operates under the imprimatur of a foreign
government" 23 -thus suggesting that even government-sponsored
arbitration may not be eligible for § 1782 requests. The Biedermann
court also emphasized, as had the NBC court, that the broad discovery
of § 1782 did not seem to accord with the general policies and goals
behind arbitration and could easily undermine many of arbitration's
perceived benefits.2
16 Id
17 Nat'l Broad Co., 165 F.3d at 189.
18 Id at 190-91.
19 Id at 191.
20 Id at 188-89.
21 168 F.3d 880 (5th Cir. 1999).
22 Id. at 883.
23 Id at 882.
24 Id at 882-83.
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After Biedermann, no court addressed this question de novo for
several years. By the time the issue arose again, the Supreme Court
had handed down an important decision interpreting the language of
§ 1782. As later cases show, it is unclear how important NBC and
Biedermann remain in light of the Supreme Court's decision.2
11. THE SUPREmE COURT'S INTEL HOLDINGS: SUBSTANTIAL
GUIDANCE WITHOUT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSING ARBITRAL PANELS
The Supreme Court interpreted the language of § 1782 in Intel
Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., but did not reach the question
of arbitral panels.2 The Court did, however, describe the policy
grounds behind § 1782 in great detail and list a number of
considerations for courts to use in considering any request for
discovery under § 1782 .2
Plaintiff Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. ("AMD") filed an antitrust
action against Intel Corp. with the Directorate-General for
Competition of the Commission of the European Communities
("CEC"), an international arbitration panel .2  AMD then made a
request for discovery under § 1782, but the district court determined
that § 1782 did not empower it to grant the request.29 The Ninth
Circuit reversed and the Supreme Court affirmed, providing guidance
for the district court's subsequent ruling on the merits of the request.30
Intel argued that the CEC was not a "foreign or international
tribunal" for the purposes of § 1782 because the matter was still under
investigation only and had not come before an adjudicative body.'
However, the Court noted that the results of the CEC 's investigation
would be reviewable by two courts that are undoubtedly tribunals for
the purposes of § 1782 .3 Because these higher courts' review was
confined to the record before the CEC, § 1782 discovery would come
before them only if ordered for use by the CEC .3  The Court therefore
held that the CEC is included in the scope of § 1782 "to the extent
25 Compare In re Oxus Gold PLC (Oxus Gold 11), No. 06-82-GEB, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 24061 (D.N.J. Apr. 2, 2007) (adhering to the standards articulated in NBC and
Biedermann by holding that an arbitral panel might be a tribunal within the scope of § 1782
because it was a governmental rather than private panel), with In re ROZ Trading, Ltd., 469 F.
Supp. 2d 1221 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (holding, based on Intel, that a private arbitral panel might be a
tribunal within the scope of § 1782).
26 542 U.S. 241 (2004).
27 Id
28 Idat 246.
29 Id
30 Id
31 Idat 258.
32 Idat 257.
33 Id
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that it acts as a first-instance decisionmnaker." 34 Additionally, the
Court cited the Commission's 1964 report recommending the current
language as evidence of legislative intent that the phrase "foreign or
international tribunal" be interpreted broadly. 35 The Court
parenthetically quoted a commentator who stated that "[t]he term
'tribunal' . . . includes investigating magistrates, administrative and
arbitral tribunals, and quasi-judicial agencies."136
The Court also rejected a "foreign-discoverability rule" on which
lower courts had been divided.3 Such a rule would allow § 1782
requests only for evidence that would be discoverable if located in the
jurisdiction of the proceedings for which it is sought, i.e., within the
jurisdiction of the foreign or international tribunal.3 In declining to
adopt this rule, the Court noted that the comparison of different legal
systems is not necessarily a useful exercise. 39 It also emphasized that
while § 1782 allows courts to grant discovery requests, it does not
require them to do so. The Court held that courts should use
discretion to deny or alter discovery requests in ways that best serve
the policy goals of § 1782 .40 The Court used similar logic to dispense
with the domestic-discoverability argument, which would not allow
courts to order discovery pursuant to § 1782 requests in
circumstances where United States law would not allow discovery in
analogous domestic circumstances.'
Finally, the Court listed factors for lower courts to consider in
determining whether to grant § 1782 requests. The first factor the
Court found relevant was whether discovery was sought from a
participant in the foreign proceeding or from a non-participant. The
Court found that § 1782 is less valuable when discovery is sought
from a participant in the foreign proceeding because the foreign
tribunal itself may order discovery from participants. Consequently,
the Court indicated that the need for § 1782 discovery should
generally be viewed as greater when sought from nonparticipants.4
Another factor the Court instructed lower courts to consider was the
foreign court or government's likely response to the discovery order.
34 Id at 258.
35 Id at 257-58.
36 Id. at 258 (quoting Hans Smit, International Litigation Under the United States Code,
65 COLUM. L. REv. 1015, 1026 n.71 (1965)) (emphasis added).
37 Id. at 259-62.
39 Id
39 Id
40 Idat 260-62.
41 Id at 262--64. Justice Breyer argued, in his dissent, that discovery requests should be
denied in most cases where the evidence met neither a domestic nor foreign discoverability test.
Id at 270 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
42 Id. at 264 (majority opinion).
540 Vol. 59:2
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Courts ".May take into account the nature of the foreign tribunal, the
character of the proceedings underway abroad, and the receptivity
of the foreign government or the court or agency abroad to U. S.
federal-court judicial assistance.A The third factor is the motives of
the parties making the request. Courts should consider whether the
§ 1782 request is an attempt to circumvent the policies of the United
States or a foreign country."4 For example, a party might use a § 1782
request to avoid the discovery requirements of the foreign court. The
Court also indicated that discovery requests may be trimmed when
they are overly burdensome 45 or consider other factors unique to a
46particular case.
As a whole, the Court's opinion demonstrates a preference for
court-exercised discretion rather than categorical limitations on§ 1782's scope. This discretion is to be guided by a consideration of
(1) who is making the request 47 (2) individual characteristics of the
tribunal and any governments involved,4 (3) whether the request is
overly burdensome' 49 and (4) policy concerns or other factors the
court deems relevant to the request.5 Intel generally suggests that the
categorical limitations that would arise from otherwise limited or
narrow readings of the statute are not flexible and do not allow courts
to handle the nuance and complexity that may be involved in a § 1782
request.
111. HAS INTEL DECISIVELY OVERRULED NBC AND BIEDERA NA?
Since the Court announced its decision in Intel, three district courts
have addressed the issue of § 1782 requests for evidence to be used in
arbitration. In each case, the district court granted the request. Two
cases, In re ROZ Trading Ltd ("ROZ Trading")5 1 and In re Hallmark
Capital Corp. ("Hallmark"),52 held that Intel had overruled NBC and
Biedermann. The third, In re Oxus Gold, PLC (Oxus Gold I),5 did
43 Id
44 Idat 264-65.
45 Id
46 Id at 266 (noting that other issues in the case remain "unexplored" and should be
evaluated on remand.).
47 Id at 264 (holding that courts should consider whether the discovery is sought from a
participant or a non-participant).
48 Id; see supra text accompanying note 43.
49 Id at 265 ("[U]nduly intrusive or burdensome requests may be rejected or trimmed.").
50 Id at 266 (suggesting that the lower court should consider issues such as the risk that
granting the request will disclose confidential information).
51 469 F. Supp. 2d 1221 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
52 534 F. Supp. 2d 951 (D. Minn. 2007).
53 No. 06-82-GEB, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24061 (D.N.J. Apr. 2, 2007); see also In re
Oxus Gold, PLC (Oxrus Gold 1), No. 06-82, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74118 (D.N.J. Oct. 10,
2006).
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not consider Intel relevant. Instead, the court determined that NBC
and Biedermann could be distinguished based on the facts and
therefore did not control. These three district court cases show that
Intel may have muddied the waters for courts dealing with these
§ 1782 requests. Furthermore, Intel itself did not discuss NBC or
Biedermann, leaving ambiguity about how the Court would have
resolved the primary question in those cases. The three post-Intel
cases represent the lower courts' unsuccessful attempts to resolve that
ambiguity.
A. Intel & Arbitral Panels: Negating the Impact of NBC and
Biedermann
The district court deciding ROZ Trading found Intel to be
instructive, even though the Intel Court had not specifically discussed
private arbitral panels. 54 The ROZ Trading court first noted that Intel
quoted language naming arbitral panels as tribunals."5 Second, it
pointed out that the arbitral panels in question (those convened by the
International Arbitral Centre of the Austrian Federal Economic
Chamber) were "'.first-instance decisionmaker[s]' that issue decisions
'both responsive to the complaint and reviewable in court."' 56 The
court did not, however, discuss whether reviewing courts would be
able to take their own evidence or, as in Intel, would be limited to the
evidence before the first-instance decisionmaker.
Most importantly, the ROZ Trading court found that the language
of § 1782 is not ambiguous because the term tribunal is widely
understood to include arbitral panels.5 The absence of ambiguity
made it unnecessary for the court to interpret the legislative history on
which the NBC and Biedermann courts relied. 58 Nevertheless, the
ROZ Trading court noted that because the general purpose of the
changes to § 1782 had been to broaden the range of proceedings
eligible for § 1782 requests, the court's decision did not conflict with
54 ROZ Trading, 469 F. Supp. at 1224 ("Although the Supreme Court in Intel did not
address the precise issue of whether private arbitral panels are 'tribunals' within the meaning of
the statute, it provided sufficient guidance for the Court to determine that arbitral panels
convened by the [International Arbitral Centre of the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber in
Vienna] are
'tribunals' within the statute's scope.").
55 Id. at 1225; see supra note 36 and accompanying text.
56 ROZ Trading, 469 F. Supp. at 1225 (quoting Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices,
Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 255 (2004)).
57 Id. at 1226.
58 Id. at 1225 ("Unless there is a 'clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary,
[unambiguous] language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive."' (quoting United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981)).
Vol. 59:2542
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the legislative history.59 Finally, ROZ Trading also held that Intel,
taken as a whole, undermined the holdings of NBC and Biedermnann
by following reasoning that directly contradicted those decisions.6
The Hallmark court reached a similar conclusion regarding NBC
and Biedermann, although it emphasized different considerations .6'
The ROZ Trading court had engaged in a textual analysis of the
phrase "foreign or international tribunal," as had the NBC and
Biedermann courts. In contrast, the Hallmark court focused on Intel's
broad interpretation of § 1782(a).6 The court cited Intel's rejection of
categorical limitations as well as its emphasis on the courts'
discretion to deny any § 1782 request.6
The Hallmark court also addressed the argument that use of
§ 1782(a) in arbitrations would create a conflict with the FAA by
allowing discovery broader than permitted under the FAA. The
court noted that the "foreign-discoverability" question posed an
analogous problem.64 In Intel, the Supreme Court had found that
a proper exercise of discretion on the part of the lower courts
would sufficiently address any difficulties arising from a lack of
foreign-discoverability. The Hallmark court reasoned that courts
should similarly consider the discovery allowed under the FAA when
deciding § 1782 requests for arbitration.6
B. Not All Courts Have Considered Intel Relevant to Arbitral Panels
Oxus Gold it66 breaks with the other two district courts in
interpreting Intel's application to § 1782. Oxus Gold II involved a
request for discovery to assist in the proceedings of an arbitral panel
conducted pursuant to a treaty between Kyrgyzstan and the United
Kingdom.6 The treaty provided that the arbitration was governed by
the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law ("IJNCITRAL").6 ' The arbitration was not,
however, formally overseen or conducted by the United Kingdom,
Kyrgyzstan, or the United Nations .69 The arbitrators were private
59 Id. at 1226.
60 Id at 1226-27 ("The reasoning in Intel demonstrates the structural and analytical flaws
in the Second and Fifth Circuits' interpretations of § 1782(a).").
61 In re Hallmark Capital Corp., 534 F. Supp. 2d 951 (D. Minn. 2007).
62 Id at 956.
63 Id
64 Id
65 Id
66 No. 06-82-GEB, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24061 (D.N.J. Apr. 2, 2007). In Oxus Gold I,
the magistrate's decision in Urnus Gold I was appealed to the district court.
67 Id at *3-...
68 Id at* *14.
69 Id. at *11-14.
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individuals resolving a commercial dispute between private parties. 7 0
Rather than turn to Intel, the Oxus Gold II court relied on the NBC
and Biedermann precedent. Although the NBC and Biedermann
courts clearly stated that "foreign or international tribunals" do not
include private arbitral panels, Oxus Gold II highlighted these courts'
failure to define private arbitral panels.7
The Oxus Gold HI court, however, did not find it necessary to
define a "private arbitral panel." The magistrate judge had decided
that the arbitral panel at issue was included in the scope of § 1782.7
The district court confined its inquiry to whether the magistrate's
holding was "clearly erroneous or contrary to law."73 Finding that it
was not, the court affirmed § 1782's application to the arbitral panel
at issue.7 This holding implies that arbitral panels that enjoy some
sort of government endorsement may be included within § 1782 even
when they do not act as official state courts. Furthermore, it hints that
courts should have discretion in determining whether a panel is
private or government-sponsored.
The Oxus Gold I court mentioned the factors from Intel and
ordered that the request be trimmed to be less burdensome. 75
However, neither Oxus Gold I nor Oxus Gold II contained an analysis
of the Intel factors to determine whether the court should grant a
discovery request for an arbitral panel. Having determined that an
arbitral panel is a tribunal for the purposes of § 1782, the court did not
consider the relevance of the Intel factors to an arbitration.
IV. MAKING SENSE OF THE ExPAI'NDING AMBIGUITY IN § 1782
The holding in Oxus Gold II was based on the premise that Intel
was not relevant to discovery requests for arbitration panels, or to the
NBC and Biedermann precedents, because it had not specifically
discussed arbitral panels. Although ROZ Trading also followed NBC
and Biedermann in that it relied on a textual analysis of § 1782, ROZ
Trading found that Intel's guidance mandated a different conclusion.
Hallmark, in contrast, did not rely heavily on text, but instead went
directly to the arguments addressed in Intel. As a result, Hallmark
may have followed Intel more closely than the other courts. However,
70 Id *2-.
7Id. at* 1213.
72 In re Oxus Gold, PLC (Ox~us Gold I), No. 06-82, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74118 (D.N.J.
Oct. 10,2006).
73 Oxus Gold!!, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24061, at *14.
74 Id at *22.
75 Oxus Gold!1, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74118, at *20.2 1.
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the division between these cases shows the lack of clarity available to
guide future courts called upon to decide similar cases.
The policy concerns regarding § 1782 requests for arbitral panels
do not clearly support a single interpretation. Scholars have long
argued that allowing § 1782 to include arbitration would best serve
the policies of international legal cooperation underlying the 1964
revisions to the statute.7 Others have criticized this argument for
ignoring the underlying policies of the FAA and arbitration more
generally."7 Recent cases demonstrate that Intel has not definitively
resolved this dispute, which will inevitably arise again as
international arbitration grows in popularity.
Opponents of encompassing arbitration within the scope of § 1782
mirror the logic of the NBC and Biedermann courts. Specifically, they
argue that the purposes and benefits of arbitration, including
efficiency and economy, are undermined by extensive discovery.7
This issue is not directly addressed in Intel, nor have the post-Intel
cases refuted this argument. However, the wording of the statute, the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute, and the broader goals of
comity and cooperation support a broad reading of the term
"tribunal." None of the policy concerns, either supporting or opposing
a broad interpretation of § 1782, is to be dismissed lightly. Each
argument may weigh differently depending on the particular facts of a
case. As suggested by the Supreme Court's rejection of categorical
limitations on § 1782, the resolution of § 1782 requests should not be
formulaic. Instead, courts should use their discretion to carefully
weigh the factors relevant to specific facts.
76 See generally Walter B. Stahr, Discovery Under 28 US. C. § 1782 for Foreign and
International Proceedings, 30 VA. J. INT'L. L. 597, 615-19 (1990) ("[lederal courts. ... should
interpret the term 'tribunal' in section 1782 to include not only courts and other adjudicative
entities, but also other reasonably impartial official decisionmakers."); Hans Smit, International
Litigation Under the United States Code, 65 CoLum. L. REv. 1015, 1026 n.71 ("The term
'tribunal' embraces all bodies exercising adjudicatory powers, and includes ... arbitral tribunals
77 See Anna Conley, A New World of Discovery: The Ramifications of Two Recent
Federal Courts' Decisions Granting Judicial Assistance to Arbitral Tribunals Pursuant to 28
US.C. § 1782, 17 Am. REv. INT'L. ARB. 45, 64, 68 (2006) ("Filling the FAA's discovery gaps
with § 1782 is a far inferior solution to amending the FAA or enacting a new arbitration statute
.... Applying § 1782 to arbitral tribunals further blurs the line between litigation and
arbitration.").
78 See, e.g., id at 69 ("[Compelling discovery that does not meet a foreign discoverability
test] would certainly run counter to arbitration as a 'creature of contract' by which parties can
control the scope and extent of discovery, thereby keeping costs down and expediting a
decision.").
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A. Intel Overrules the Reasoning oJNBC and Biedermann
The Intel Court fuilly considered the conflicting policy goals
relevant to the interpretation of § 1782. The Court rejected the
assumption that policy concerns relevant to individual § 1782
petitions must inform the interpretation of the statute's text. In
response to the argument for a foreign-discoverability requirement,
the Court concluded that although "comity and parity concerns may
be important as touchstones for a district court's exercise of discretion
in particular cases, they do not permit our insertion of a generally
applicable foreign-discoverability rule into the text of § 1782(a)."7
Comity and parity must be weighed in each individual petition. A
district court should consider the potential effects (like increased
costs) that grants of discovery may have on arbitration as a dispute
resolution mechanism. However, these valid concerns do not alter the
text of § 1782. This policy issue is more properly considered in the
Court's exercise of discretion in each individual case rather than in
the interpretation of the statutory language.
The legislative history of § 1782 supports the Court's conclusions
in Intel. While the Biedermann court was accurate in observing that it
is unlikely that Congress specifically contemplated the application of
§ 1782 to "the then-novel arena of international commercial
arbitration," 80 this only indicates that Congress did not form a specific
intent with regard to private arbitration. This does not preclude the
statute's application to arbitral panels. The statute, in both its precise
language and general intent, suggests that arbitral panels are tribunals.
After all, the Commission recommended changes in the language of §
1782 "[iln view of the constant growth of administrative and quasi-
judicial proceedings all over the world."8 ' This language suggests an
awareness of the ongoing process through which proceedings and
adjudicative bodies may change form without abandoning those
characteristics that make § 1782 useful. This is arguably the precise
reason that Congress did not define "tribunal" with a specific list of
adjudicatory bodies. The phrase "foreign or international tribunal,"
lie the other changes implemented in the 1964 revision,8  offers
courts broad discretionary power to compel discovery. The
Commission's report suggests that Congress intended for the new
79 Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 261 (2004).
80 Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int'l, 168 F.3d 880, 882 (5th Cir. 1999).
81 S. Rep. No. 88-1580, at 9 (1964). reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782. 3788.
82 For a discussion of the changes to § 1782, see S. Rep. No. 88-1580 (1964), reprinted in
1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782. For example, § 1782 was changed to no longer require that the United
States be party to the treaty that had created the international tribunal at issue. Id. at 3784-85.
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language to include adjudicative bodies, like private arbitral panels,
that had not yet come into widespread use.
To reiterate, the history of § 1782 and the Court's interpretation of
the statute both strongly suggest that courts have discretion to grant
discovery requests for arbitral panels. This cannot, however, override
the policy concerns that led the NBC and Biedermann courts to
conclude that granting such requests would be problematic in most, if
not all, cases." Based on the policy concerns associated with
compelling discovery in arbitration, courts following Intel's guidance
should typically use their discretion to deny § 1782 requests for
arbitral panels. All three post-Intel cases have granted at least some
portion of the requested discovery, leading to the inference that the
courts have failed to apply Intel appropriately.
B. The Post-Intel Cases Have Not Exercised Discretion in the Manner
Intel Encouraged
In light of the broad discretion strongly supported by the Intel
Court, it is not immediately clear that the post-Intel decisions fail to
follow the Court's direction. After all, these courts engaged in
independent analysis and did not strictly follow the categorical
limitations from prior cases. However, these decisions share the same
faults as NBC and.Biedermann-they fail to truly isolate their
interpretation of the statute from their exercise of the discretion
granted by the statute. The NBC and Biedermann courts applied
policy concerns appropriate to the exercise of discretion, but did so
during their interpretation of the statute. These courts found that the
language of the statute could not be interpreted to include arbitral
panels because there was a possibility of conflict with the FAA. It
would have been more appropriate for the courts to recognize that
such panels are included in the statute's language, but to use their
discretion to deny requests that conflicted with the policies underlying
the FAA.
In contrast, the post-Intel courts properly removed these concerns
from the interpretation of the statutory language, but then failed to
consider the relevant policy when exercising their discretion under
Intel. After finding that it was in their discretion to grant these
requests, all three courts did compel discovery-without discussing
the potential policy ramifications. This is problematic because the
policy concerns raised in NBC and Biedermann suggest that, in most
instances, courts should use their discretion to deny § 1782 requests
for arbitral proceedings. Because the post-Intel courts may have failed
to properly scrutinize the requests in light of all relevant policy
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concerns, these cases do no more than NBC or Biedermann to follow
Intel or to reach a conclusion consistent with the plain language and
legislative history of § 1782.
1. Oxus Gold 11
Each of the three cases followed different reasoning. Oxus Gold II,
for example, adhered to the holdings in NBC and Biedermann. 8 3 The
court relied heavily on the distinction between government-sponsored
and private arbitral panels.8 Rather than discussing this distinction in
the context of the Intel factors, the court relied on NBC and
Biedermann to determine that requests may be granted for
government panels and not private ones.8 While it is undoubtedly
important for the court to note the nature of the tribunal for which
discovery is requested this is properly analyzed with the second Intel
factor (considering me individual characteristics of the tribunal and
any governments involved) rather than as a "categorical limitation"
on § 1782.8 Having determined that § 1782 authorized the court to
grant the request, the Oxus Gold II court did not consider the
possibility of discretionary denial.
The magistrate determined that "[s]ection 1782 is applicable to the
present case and that Petitioner has satisfied the requirements of the
statute. Therefore, there is no basis to [deny the request]."8 The court
did not consider the Intel factors. 88 Most importantly, it did not
consider whether granting the request would, in fact, further the
policies of comity and cooperation underlying § 1782. Instead, the
court merely noted that because Intel determined that there is no
foreign-discoverability requirement, "a district court need not
consider [foreign-discoverability] before it decides whether to grant a
Section 1782 request.",89 This characterization of Intel's holding,
while technically correct, is too general and ignores the Court's
detailed instruction:
[The foreign-discoverability requirement] may be relevant in
determining whether a discovery order should be granted in a
83 In re Oxus Gold, PLC (Oxus Gold fl), No. 06-82-GEB, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2406 1,
at *lI1-..14 (D.N.J. Apr. 2, 2007).
84 Id.
85 Id. at * 13.
86 Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 264 (2004).
87 In re Oxus Gold, PLC (Oxus Gold]), No. 06-82, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74118, at *20
(D.N.J. Oct 10, 2006).
88 The court inserted boilerplate language reciting Intel's holding, but did not discuss how
any of the Intel factors applied to the facts at hand. Id at * 18-20.
89 Id at *20-2 1.
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particular case.... Specifically, a district court could
consider whether the § 1782 request conceals an attempt to
circumvent .. . policies of a foreign country or the United
States."0
The Oxus Gold II court should have considered whether the
requested evidence was discoverable in foreign or domestic
proceedings because it is an important, but not determinative, part of
deciding whether the request should be granted. If the foreign
procedure in Oxus Gold II was designed to facilitate quick dispute
resolution at low cost to the parties-as is often the purpose of
arbitration in the United States-the court should have denied the
request because it would frustrate those policies. Like NBC and
Biedermann, Oxus Gold II assumes that the statutory language, rather
than the court's discretion, is the primary tool by which requests
should be denied. It concludes that if the statute does not prohibit a
request, the court should grant the request in most cases. This
assumption cannot be reconciled with the Intel Court's broad
description of courts' discretionary powers under § 1782.
2. ROZ Trading, Ltd.
Unlike the Oxus Gold II court, the ROZ Trading court did consider
the Intel factors. The discovery request in that case pertained to an
international arbitration at the International Arbitral Centre (the
"Centre") in Austria, which arranges dispute resolution for litigants
from a variety of jurisdictions. 91 Citing Intel, the court placed great
weight on the Centre's "likely receptivity" to the evidence
requested.9 The Centre's procedural rules made specific reference to
discovery requests in foreign courts, as the court quoted:
"Those judicial acts considered necessary by the arbitrators
but which they have no jurisdiction to undertake will be
carried out by the State Court which has jurisdiction on the
application of the arbitrators. In case of doubt the application
is to be made to the District Court in whose district the act is
to be carried out or the evidence to be taken." 93
9Intel, 542 U.S. at 264.
9' In re ROZ Trading, Ltd., 469 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1223 (N.D. Ga. 2006); see supra text
accompanying notes 52-58.
92 ROZ Trading, 469 F. Supp. 2d at 1228-29.
93 Id at 1229 (emphasis added). For the Centre's current rules, see INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRAL CENTRE OF THE AUSTRIAN FEDERAL ECONOMIC CHAMBER, RULES OF ARBITRATION
AND CONCILIATION (VIENNA RULES), available at http://portal.wko.atlwk/format-detail.wk?
AngID=I1&StID327905&DstID=0&Br1D=O.
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The court concluded that "[t]he Centre is fundamentally international
in nature. It must rely on the aid of courts beyond its jurisdiction-
such as United States District Courts acting pursuant to § 1 782(a)--to
enforce its demands and to aid its inquiries."9 The court ignored,
however, that the Centre's rules refer only to "applications of the
arbitrators." ROZ Trading dealt with a petition by one of the parties, 9 5
and therefore was not contemplated in the Centre's rules. The court
assumed that the cited rule indicated the Centre's receptivity to
evidence sought by anyone and not only evidence specifically
requested by the arbitrators. However, if the arbitrators wished to
consider that evidence, the Centre's rules specifically encourage them
to make the application directly, rather than relying on the parties to
do so. The arbitrators' failure to make the application may indicate
that they were not, in fact, receptive to the evidence.
While the ROZ Trading court did consider Intel, it failed to
incorporate the NBC and Biedermann concerns into the Intel
framework. As the earlier cases noted, the FAA allows courts to grant
discovery requests made by arbitrators but not those made by the
parties.9 Noting this, the court should have considered whether the
facts of ROZ Trading justified some departure from this rule, which
would ordinarily apply to arbitration in the United States. Although
the Centre's rules may support granting certain requests, the request
made in ROZ Trading is not one of these. Furthermore, because the
Centre's arbitration policies are similar to the FAA, the § 1782
request at issue may have been an attempt to circumvent the rule
allowing only arbitrators to make discovery requests. As Intel
suggests, courts should not grant requests that represent the
petitioner's attempt to bypass an arbitration proceeding's discovery
rules. In ROZ Trading, the court did not explain why it granted a
request that failed to comply with the arbitration policies of the
United States or the international tribunal.
3. Hallmark
The Hallmark decision best applies the principles laid out in Intel.
Hallmark involved a party's request for discovery from a non-party to
assist in a private arbitration in Israel.97 The court expressly noted that
it might use its discretion to deny requests for "excessive or
94 ROZ Trading, 469 F. Supp. 2d at 1229.
95 Id. at 1223.
96 See Nat'l Broad. Co. v. Bear Steams & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 186-87 (2d. Cir. 1999);
Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int'l, 168 F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir. 1999).
97 In re Hallmark Capital Corp., 534 F. Supp. 2d. 951, 953 (D. Minn. 2007); see also
supra text accompanying notes 59-63.
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burdensome discovery that would undermine the otherwise
streamlined procedures of arbitration,"98 showing that the court was
aware of the concerns raised in NBC and Biedermann. The Israeli
arbitrator had apparently indicated to the court his or her "receptivity"
to the requested evidence, though the court did not describe the nature
or extent of this receptivity. 99 Citing Intel, the Hallmark court
determined that any comity concerns were put to rest by the Israeli
arbitrator's willingness to accept the evidence. 00 In this, the court
accurately summarized the Intel holdings and applied them to the
facts at hand.
The court also appropriately analogized between the
foreign-discoverability requirement rejected in Intel and a
categorical prohibition on discovery in arbitration. The court held that
although there may be policy reasons for denying discovery in
arbitration, § 1782 leaves this up to the court's discretion.10'
However, the court did not consider whether the request at issue
would undermine the purposes of arbitration, but treated the
arbitrator's willingness to accept the evidence as dispositive.
While Intel did place great weight on the foreign tribunal's
receptivity, it also instructed courts to consider the "receptivity of the
foreign government or the court or agency abroad."102 In many cases,
government, court, or agency views will be the same because the
tribunal will represent the foreign government, court, or agency.
Arbitration is an exception to this general rule. The arbitrator is a
private individual often selected by the parties. He or she is not part
of a foreign government and may not always represent its views or
policies. In arbitration, courts should be wary of giving too much
weight to the arbitrators' opinions, which may not be as valuable as
those of a judge or other individual authorized to speak on behalf of
the foreign government.
However, there is nothing in the Hallmark facts to suggest that the
arbitrator was wrong or that Israel had a contradictory arbitration
policy. Assuming that the arbitrator accurately represented Israeli
policy, it is worth noting that the request-made by a party rather
than an arbitrator-would have been denied if governed by the FAA.
However, if there is no conflict with the policies of the Israeli
98 In re Hallmark, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 957.
99 Id at 957.
101d at 958 ("'..When the foreign tribunal would readily accept relevant informnation
discovered in the United States, application of a foreign-discoverability rule would be
senseless."' (quoting Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 262 (2004)).
'
1 Id. at 956-57.
102 Intel, 542 U.S. at 264.
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government, the policies underlying the FAA do not justify denying
the request. The reasons that the request was made by a party rather
than an arbitrator may be unrelated to the policy concerns discussed
in NBC and Biedermann. For example, the Israeli arbitrator may have
perhaps not known enough about § 1782 to understand that the
petition would have greater merit if filed by the arbitrator. Indeed, it
is not clear that the American courts have yet reached that conclusion.
Situations like this demonstrate how a broad interpretation of the
statutory language, complemented by a thorough exercise of the
court's discretion, may advance § 1782's underlying purposes of
international comity and cooperation.
CONCLUSION
Although Intel did not explicitly determine whether a private
arbitral panel is a "foreign or international tribunal," it provided
guidance for courts interpreting and applying § 1782. The Court's
reasoning strongly suggests that § 1782 should be understood as
broadly as possible, even though this will mean that courts will often
have the authority to grant unwarranted discovery requests that do not
further the statute's goal of international comity. The language and
policy of § 1782 mandate that courts should be restrained by their
own discretion rather than a narrow interpretation of the statute.
To assist the lower courts in their exercise of discretion, Intel
provides a list of factors to consider. The list is not necessarily
exclusive and other considerations may be relevant, especially where
the tribunal at issue has notably different characteristics than the
tribunal in Intel. In arbitration proceedings, courts should therefore
consider arbitration's general purpose as well as the policies of the
jurisdiction controlling the panel.
Unfortunately, the recent three cases considering § 1782 requests
for arbitral panels have not consistently followed the Intel guidance.
Oxus Gold II does not consider the factors at all, while ROZ Trading
misapplies them. Hallmark, however, follows Intel's four-factor test
well. Although the value of the arbitrator's opinions is unclear, it
otherwise applies Intel's holdings and reasoning well. Future courts
would do well to examine the Hallmark analysis and not to place
excessive weight on the other cases. An accurate and faithful
application of the Intel guidance will ensure that orders for discovery
under § 1782 serve to further the underlying purposes of the statute.
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